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Davis v. United States: The Supreme Court
Rejects a Third Layer of Prophylaxis
Q. Why did you continue talking to them after you say you
said, "I think I should have an attorney"?
A. Have you ever been interrogated by three Rockford Police
Detectives?
Q. No, I haven't, but I want to know why you continued talking
to them.
A. Because I believed it was self-defense. I still do. They
wanted a statement of what happened to clear it up. I wanted
to get it off my chest, so I gave them a statement.
Q. But you know you had a right to have an attorney there if
you wanted one, didn't you?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. You ever insist on having an attorney contacted?
A. I asked for an attorney before I began the statement, and I
saw that it was not going to get me anywhere, so I just ceased
on that line, because I just knew I wasn't going to get an
attorney anyways.
Q. Did it occur to you not to talk any further?
A. Yes, but it occurred to me I might be up all night and be
badgered by these three detectives.I
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares:
"No person shall be.. . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."2 In 1966, the Supreme Court decided Miranda v.
Arizona,3 which, in line with the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against
self-incrimination, mandates that law enforcement personnel follow
certain procedural safeguards during custodial interrogations.4
Miranda provided for the preservation of suspects' Fifth Amendment privileges by requiring police to inform suspects in custody,
1. People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 539 (Il1. 1980) (quoting, in part, the crossexamination of the defendant), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda combined four separate cases for which the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari: Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir.
1965); State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965); People v. Stewart, 400 P.2d 97
(Cal. 1965); People v. Vignera, 207 N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1965). Miranda, 384 U.S. at
436.
4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73.
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prior to questioning, of their constitutional rights.5 Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Warren acknowledged the inherently coercive
nature of custodial interrogation 6 and sought to ensure that any statements made by suspects are voluntary. Thus, the Miranda Court
provided that interrogating officers, prior to questioning, must advise
suspects of their right to remain silent, their right to have an attorney
present during questioning, and their right to have an attorney appointed if they cannot afford one. 8 According to Miranda,if suspects
"indicate[] in any manner," 9 at any stage of the process, that they
desire counsel, officers must stop questioning until an attorney is

5. Id. at 444.
6. Id. at 455-56. Justice Warren noted that "the very fact of custodial interrogation
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals." Id.
at 455. The Miranda Court further described custodial interrogation in the following
manner:
An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody,
surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to . . . techniques of
persuasion . . . cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a
practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police
station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations,
where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or
trickery.
Id. at 461.
7. See id. (explaining the impropriety of admitting into evidence statements that are
not voluntary).
8. Id. at 444. The suspects' right to remain silent raises separate issues that will not
be addressed here. For a discussion of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, see
WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 28.5 (1986).
Prior to Miranda, the Supreme Court determined the admissibility of a suspects'
statements based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under the
"voluntariness" test. B. JAMES GEORGE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES 259-61 (PLI Criminal Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 1, 1969);
see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (relying on the Due Process Clause
to evaluate the voluntariness of a statement obtained during custodial interrogation).
After Brown, the Court decided roughly 35 confession cases relying solely on the Due
Process Clause. GEORGE, supra, at 259-61; see, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528,
530 (1963) .(finding a confession inadmissible under the Due Process Clause where a
suspect confessed only after the police made threats that the State would cut off financial
aid and take away her children if she did not cooperate); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 322-23 (1959) (holding a confession inadmissible under the Due Process Clause
where interrogating officials continuously questioned the accused for over eight hours
and repeatedly denied the accused's requests to consult with counsel).
9. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. The "in any manner" language of Miranda is the
source of the pre-Davis conflict regarding unclear references to counsel. See infra part
II.C. The Miranda Court's language suggested that law enforcement officials must cease
questioning and extend the right to counsel to suspects upon any reference to counsel,
no matter how equivocal or ambiguous. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. This Note
will focus only on ambiguous or equivocal requests for counsel during custodial
interrogation.
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present. o
Fifteen years later, the Court reaffirmed Miranda in Edwards v.
Arizona," holding that once suspects invoke their right to counsel
during custodial interrogation, police officials must cease interrogation
and may not resume questioning unless or until counsel is provided, or
if the suspects initiate further conversations with police. 2
While Miranda and Edwards provided rigid rules for police officials
to follow once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, the Court did not
offer guidance to officers in those situations where a suspect's reference to counsel was unclear, leaving the officer unsure as to whether
that suspect was invoking the right to counsel. 3 Lower courts, faced
with interpreting whether ambiguous or equivocal references to
counsel invoked the procedural safeguards of Miranda and Edwards,
have developed differing interpretations of the proper procedure which
14
law enforcement personnel should follow in these circumstances.
The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the conflicting standards
among the lower courts, 5 did not specifically address the issue of
ambiguous or equivocal requests for counsel until Davis v. United
States.'
This Note traces the law leading to the Davis decision beginning
with a brief explanation of the Court's decisions in Miranda and
Edwards. 7 It then reviews the three approaches lower courts previously used when interpreting the adequacy of equivocal or
ambiguous references to counsel: (1) the Sixth Circuit's "per se bar"
approach; 8 (2) the Fifth Circuit's "clarification" approach; 9 and (3)
10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
11. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
12. Id. at 484-85.
13. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354 (1994). In Davis, the Supreme
Court admitted that it had not addressed the issue of ambiguous or equivocal references to
counsel during custodial interrogation. Id.
14. See infra part II.C.
15. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354. The Davis Court stated: "[W]e have twice previously
noted the varying approaches the lower courts have adopted with respect to ambiguous
or equivocal references to counsel during custodial interrogation . . . ." Id. (citing
Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529-30 n.3 (1987) and Smith v. Illinois, 469
U.S. 91, 96 n.3 (1984) (per curiam)).
16. Id. at 2350. Prior to Davis, the Court had twice explicitly declined to rule on the
permissible limits of interrogation following unclear requests for counsel. See Barrett,
479 U.S. at 529-30 n.3 (finding it unnecessary to address the question left open in
Smith); Smith, 469 U.S. at 96 (holding that the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court
must be reversed regardless of the standard applied).
17. See infra part II.A-B.
18. See infra part II.C. 1.
19. See infra part II.C.2.
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the Illinois Supreme Court's "threshold standard of clarity" approach,
ultimately adopted by the Davis Court. 2°
After explaining the three conflicting approaches, this Note discusses and analyzes the Supreme Court decision in Davis v. United
States, which sets forth the "requisite level of clarity" rule. 2 1 It then
predicts that Davis is likely to create one of two results: (1) police
officers and lower courts will afford less protection to suspects' Fifth
Amendment rights during custodial interrogation; 22 or (2) states will
extend greater protection to suspects under state law during the
custodial interrogation process.23 Finally, this Note concludes that the
Supreme Court's decision will deny the Miranda and Edwards safeguards to individuals who are unable to request the assistance of
counsel clearly. 24
II. BACKGROUND

Because of the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation, 25 the Supreme Court has created several safeguards to protect
the accused and to preserve the integrity of the judicial system.26 The
Court developed prophylactic rules under Mirandaand Edwards to
20. See infra parts II.C.3 and III. In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter referred to
the Court's approach as the "requisite level of clarity" rule. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2363
(Souter, J., concurring). Neither the -Court nor Justice Souter referred to the Court's
approach as the threshold standard approach. See Davis, 114 S.Ct. 2350. However,
both the threshold standard and the requisite level of clarity rule stand for the same
proposition: Interrogating officers may continue questioning the suspect about his or
her involvement in the crime unless or until the suspect clearly requests the assistance of
counsel. See id. at 2356; People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ill. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981). Hereinafter, this Note will refer to the Davis Court's
approach as the requisite level of clarity rule.
21. See infra parts III-IV.
22. See infra part V.A.
23. See infra part V.B.
24. See infra part VI.
25. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. The Miranda Court, relying on various police
manuals, found that interrogating officers' tactics included the following: trickery or
misrepresenting the weight of the evidence against the suspect; promises of leniency;
unfair and manipulative questioning; confinement in a small place; isolation from
family, friends, or attorney; deprivation of basic amenities such as food and sleep; and
unreasonably long interrogations.
Id. at 448-55; see also supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
26. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-90 (1964) (discussing the necessity
of making individuals aware of their right to counsel); see CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD &
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS

357-58 (2d ed. 1986) (explaining that: "[T]he Supreme Court has excluded confessions
which are considered the product of 'compulsion' by the state, in part because they may
not be reliable as evidence, but primarily because society should not sanction coercive
techniques, regardless of the importance of the information they may produce.").
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ensure that confessions obtained during custodial interrogation do not
violate the accused's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.27
A. Miranda v. Arizona: The InitialLayer of Prophylaxis
In Miranda v. Arizona,28 the Supreme Court sought to provide explicit constitutional guidelines for police and courts to adhere to when
evaluating the admissibility of confessions obtained during custodial
interrogations. 29 The Supreme Court, basing its decision on the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, held that
before police officers can interrogate3 ° individuals in custody,3 1 the
officers must clearly advise these individuals: (1) of their right to
remain silent; (2) that anything they say can be used against them; (3)
of their right to consult with an attorney; and (4) of their right to have
an attorney appointed if they cannot afford counsel.32 The Court
27. Following the Miranda decision, the Court characterized the procedural safeguards
afforded in Miranda as "prophylactic" and not mandated by the Constitution. Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-45 (1974). The Court continues to adhere to this
characterization as evidenced by its recent references to Miranda. See, e.g., McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 179 (1991) ("In Miranda v. Arizona, we established a number
of prophylactic rights designed to counteract the inherently compelling pressures of
custodial interrogation, including the right to have counsel present."); see also
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990) ("Although recognizing that the
Miranda rules would result in the exclusion of some voluntary and reliable statements,
the Court imposed these 'prophylactic standards' on the States ... to safeguard the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.") (citation omitted); Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) ("[Tlhe prophylactic protections that the Miranda
warnings provide to counteract the 'inherently compelling pressures' of custodial
interrogation and to 'permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against selfincrimination' are implemented by the application of the Edwards corollary.
(citation omitted).
28. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
29. Id. at 444-45.
30. Id. at 444. Miranda defined "interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody." Id. The Court later
stated: "'Interrogation,' as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a
measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself." Rhode Island
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980).
Chief Justice Warren devoted a significant portion of the Miranda opinion to
describing the "inherently compelling pressures which . . . compel [the suspect] to
speak where [he or she] would not otherwise do so freely." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467;
see supra notes 6, 25, and accompanying text.
31. By the term "custody," Miranda included situations where "a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see, e.g., State v. Myers, 798 P.2d 453, 456 (Idaho
1990) (interpreting circumstances other than a stationhouse interrogation which
triggered Miranda).
32. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. As a necessary protection of the Fifth Amendment,
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further held that if suspects indicate "in any manner" either prior to or
during the interrogation that they wish to consult with an attorney,
questioning must cease until an attorney is provided.33
The Miranda Court specifically intended to ensure that suspects in
police custody make free and informed choices when deciding whether
to speak with police officers.34 The Court reasoned that the most
effective way to ensure suspects' Fifth Amendment privileges is to
inform suspects in police custody of their rights before questioning
begins and to give suspects the right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation.35 In reaching this conclusion, the Miranda
Court assumed: (1) that ordinary individuals are unaware of their Fifth
Amendment rights; and (2) that even when individuals are aware of
their rights, the custodial process can operate to persuade them to offer
self-incriminating statements.'
Although Miranda sought to ensure that individuals in police
custody were aware of their rights before questioning began, the
MirandaCourt did not intend its rule to impose unreasonable obstacles
on police investigations. 37 Rather, the Court sought to provide a
Miranda is applicable not only in federal criminal proceedings, but is also binding on
the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6
(1964) ("We hold today that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory selfincrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by
the States."). Miranda, however, represents only the federal constitutional standard of
protection. BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4 (1991). Thus,
while state courts may not reduce the rights afforded to the accused under Miranda, states
are free to expand the accused's individual rights as a matter of state law. Id. Indeed, the
Miranda Court explicitly encouraged both Congress and the states to develop more
efficient measures for protecting a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination during
custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
33. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. As the Court stated: "If, however, [the suspect]
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking there can be no questioning." Id. Thus, the right to have an
attorney present during custodial interrogation is not automatic, but must be
affirmatively invoked by the suspect. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-40
(1984) (indicating that the right to counsel during custodial interrogation is not selfexecuting).
34. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
35. Id. at 467-71.
In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), the Court
acknowledged that "the lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system because of
his unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial
interrogation." Id. at 719. More specifically, the Miranda Court noted that the presence
of counsel reduces the likelihood of police coercion, ensures that suspects fully
understand their rights, and guarantees that statements to police are complete and
accurate. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
36. Id. at 467-68; see supra notes 6, 25, and accompanying text.
37. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42, 477-78. Recognizing the important role of
confessions in effective criminal investigation, the Court attempted to strike a balance
between promoting legitimate police investigative activity and protecting a suspect's
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legitimate, standard procedure for interrogating officers to follow prior
to and during custodial interrogations. By imposing this standard,
the Court hoped to prevent coerced, involuntary confessions.39 The
Court warned that if officers continue questioning after suspects invoke the right to counsel, the government must show that the suspects
were fully aware of their rights and that they validly waived their
rights. 40 Arguably, by stating that questioning must cease when a
suspect "indicates in any manner" a desire for the assistance of
counsel, the Miranda Court did not require the suspect's requests for
counsel be explicit before police must cease questioning. 4' In a
subsequent decision, however, the Supreme Court backed away from
the "in any manner" standard.4 2

opportunities to exercise his or her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.
Id. at 477-78.
38. Id. at 478-79. Commenting later on the practicality of Miranda, the Court stated:
"Miranda's holding has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity
as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts
under what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation are not
admissible." Michael C., 442 U.S. at 718; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 430 (1984) ("One of the principal advantages of the [Miranda] doctrine that
suspects must be given warnings before being interrogated while in custody is the
clarity of that rule.").
39. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Court explained that "the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation
of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Id.
40. Id. at 473-74. The Court stressed that if a statement is secured from the suspect
without an attorney present, the government carries the "heavy burden" of showing that
the suspect knowingly and voluntarily relinquished his or her right to remain silent and
to obtain the assistance of counsel. Id. at 475.
4 1. As one commentator stated:
[T]he spirit of Miranda militates in favor of a broad conception of the
invocation threshold. The Miranda decision was motivated by a desire for
effective protection of vulnerable suspects against the pervasive, yet often
undetectable, dangers of custodial interrogation. Consequently, when a
suspect gives any indication of a need for counsel, that is, of vulnerability to
the inherent pressure, the spirit of Miranda seems to call for a protective
response. In this, as in other areas of Miranda law, the rationales and aims of
the Miranda scheme would seem to "require[] that ambiguity be interpreted
against the interrogator."
James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession
Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 1006 n.121 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 377 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
42. See infra part II.B.
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B. Edwards v. Arizona: The Second Layer of Prophylaxis
In Edwards v. Arizona,43 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Miranda and imposed additional safeguards which the Court believed necessary to protect those suspects who request counsel during
custodial interrogation. 44 The Court, once again basing its decision on
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, held that
once a suspect invokes the right to counsel during custodial interrogation, questioning must cease and may not resume unless or until
counsel is provided, or unless the suspect initiates further communications, conversations, or exchanges with police. 45 The Court
further held that once a suspect "clearly asserts" the right to counsel,
police officials cannot establish waiver merely by showing that the
suspect responded to further questioning by the police.' The Court
created this "second layer of prophylaxis" in order to prevent interrogating officers from badgering and persuading suspects to relinquish
their previously asserted right to counsel.47
Though Miranda recognized the right to the assistance of counsel
during custodial interrogation, and Edwards held that a suspect who
invokes the right to counsel may not be reinterrogated until counsel is
provided, neither case provided a clear guide as to the proper standard
43. 451 U.S. 477, 477-87 (1981).
44. Id. at 484-85. In Edwards, the police arrested Edwards, the defendant, and advised
him of his Miranda rights. Id. at 478. Edwards stated that he understood his rights and
was willing to talk with the police about the crime. Id. After some time, Edwards stated,
"I want an attorney before making a deal." Id. The police stopped questioning at that
point. Id. at 479. The next morning, the police again advised Edwards of his rights and
proceeded to interrogate him about his involvement in the crime. Id. Edwards answered
the officers' questions and implicated himself in the crime. Id.
45. Id. at 484-85.
46. Id. The Court instructed that a waiver of the right to counsel must be a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent relinquishment of the privilege. Id. at 482. The validity of a
waiver depends upon individual factors, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused. Id. In Edwards, the Court concluded that the lower courts
erroneously focused on the voluntariness of Edwards' confession rather than the
knowing and intelligent waiver of his previously invoked right to counsel. id. at 484.
Thus, despite the fact that Edwards agreed to talk to the detectives, the Court found that
any incriminating statements obtained during the second interrogation were
inadmissible because Edwards did not legitimately waive his previously invoked fight to
counsel. Id.
47. Id. at 482-87. The Edwards Court sought to prevent persistent questioning aimed
at wearing down the suspect's will to exercise his or her Miranda rights. Id.; see
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990) (indicating that "Edwards ...
established another prophylactic rule designed to prevent police from badgering
suspects into waiving their previously invoked Miranda rights."); Oregon v. Bradshaw,
462 U.S. 1039, 1043 (1983) (stating that the Edwards rule was invoked to prevent
suspects in police custody from being badgered by police officers in the same manner as
the suspect in Edwards).
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for determining whether the suspect successfully invoked the right to
counsel.4 The "in any manner" language in Mirandasuggests a liberal
or relaxed standard,49 while the "clearly asserted" language in Edwards
intimates a more demanding requirement.5 0 Thus, through inconsistent language, the Court has indicated both broad and narrow
approaches to equivocal requests for counsel.
C. Three-Way Split Among the Courts
Following the Miranda "in any manner" standard and the Edwards
"clarity" requirement, lower courts were unsure about the proper
procedure for the police to follow after an ambiguous or equivocal 5'
request for counsel. As a result, three conflicting approaches emerged
among courts deciding the appropriate standard for police officers to
follow when suspects make ambiguous references to counsel during
custodial interrogation. 2
1. The Per Se Bar Approach
Relying on the Miranda "in any manner" language, a number of
courts adopted a per se bar approach. 3 This approach commanded
that interrogating officers cease all questioning upon a suspect's mere
48. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
49. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. The Court expressly stated: "If ... [the suspect]
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking there can be no questioning." Id. (emphasis added).
50. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485. The Edwards Court stated: "[I]t is inconsistent with
Miranda and its progeny for the authorities... to reinterrogate an accused in custody if
he has clearly asserted his right to counsel." Id.
5 1. Prior to Edwards, the Court did not address the issue of what may be regarded as a
clear or valid invocation of the right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1984) (per curiam). As a
result, lower courts struggled in evaluating requests for counsel. See Rhonda Y. Cline,
Comment, Equivocal Requests for Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy
Considerations,55 U. CIN. L. REV. 767, 769-70 (1987).
Generally, equivocal statements include indecisive statements or statements that
express conflicting desires. See id. at 770-71. In Nash v. Estelle, for example, the
suspect stated: "I would like to have a lawyer, but I'd rather talk to you." 597 F.2d 513,
516 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
Ambiguous statements include vague or unintelligible statements. See Cline, supra, at
773. For instance: "Well, yes because my brother did say he was thinking of hiring one
himself. I don't know ... I don't know what it is, really and truly .... " was considered
an ambiguous reference to counsel in Housewright v. McCree, 689 F.2d 797, 800 (8th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1088 (1983).
52. See infra part II.C.1-3.
53. See Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978); People v. Superior Ct., 542
P.2d 1390 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); State v. Nash, 407 A.2d 365
(N.H. 1979); State v. Furlough, 797 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990); Ochoa v.
State, 573 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
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mention of counsel.5 4 Courts advocating this approach treated any
reference to counsel as a valid invocation of the right to counsel,
55
thereby prohibiting further questioning until an attorney was present.
The Sixth Circuit first advocated a per se bar approach in Maglio v.
Jago.56 In Maglio, police arrested Daniel Maglio as a suspect in a
murder investigation.5 ' A police officer read Maglio his Miranda
rights and then asked Maglio to waive his rights and make a statement. 8 Maglio responded, "Maybe I should have an attorney." 59 The
officer told Maglio that he could not consult with an attorney until the
following day, and continued questioning him about the crime.6 °
Maglio answered further questions and eventually confessed to the
murder.6 '

54. Maglio, 580 F.2d at 205 (finding that the Miranda "in any manner" language
intimates the existence of a per se rule prohibiting custodial interrogation following a
suspect's request for counsel).
55. See, e.g., Superior Ct., 542 P.2d at 1394-95. The court, relying on the "in any
manner" language of Miranda, stated:
We have observed, for example, that a suspect need not make an express
statement that he wishes to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege; "no
particular form of words or conduct is necessary." Furthermore, "to demand
that it [the privilege] be invoked with unmistakable clarity (resolving any
ambiguity against the defendant) would subvert Miranda's prophylactic
intent."
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Randall, 464 P.2d 114,
118 (Cal. 1970)).
56. 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978).
57. Id. at 202-03.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The interrogating officer reported the undisputed exchange as follows:
And I told him that, well, I can't get you an attorney right now. We will have
to stop questioning you. I said I would like to know how you got the car, but
we can't question you anymore because you are entitled to have an attorney
here, and you won't get one until you go to court. At this point he said that he
had nothing to hide, and I kind of reiterated his rights to him a little bit,
telling him he didn't have to talk and was entitled to an attorney; and I didn't
want to violate his rights, but he could waive his rights and talk to us without
an attorney. So he said that he would talk to us without an attorney.
Id. at 203 n. 1.
The state prosecutor arrived to take a tape-recorded statement 45 minutes after Maglio
confessed to committing the murder. Id. at 203. Prior to the second round of
questioning, the prosecutor informed Maglio again of his Miranda rights. Id. Maglio
expressed that he did not fully understand his rights at the time of his confession. Id.
The prosecutor once again explained his rights and Maglio stated, "I understand it now."
Id. Maglio then proceeded to repeat his confession. Id.
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The trial judge ruled that Maglio waived his right to counsel and
allowed his confession to be admitted into evidence. 2 On appeal, the
Ohio Court of Appeals held that the interrogating officers violated
63
Maglio's Miranda rights, but that the violation was harmless error.
The appellate court reasoned that Maglio's first statement did not taint
the second because Maglio expressed that he understood his rights
prior to the second confession. 64 Therefore, Maglio's waiver was
voluntary and intelligent. 65 The federal district court denied Maglio's
petition for habeas corpus relief, finding the first confession admissible because Maglio was adequately warned. 6
On review, the Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered the case
remanded to the federal district court for a new trial.67 The court,
relying on Miranda, declared that an interrogation must cease once
suspects indicate in any manner that they desire counsel, 68 reasoning
that interrogating officers should not force suspects to continuously
request the assistance of counsel.6 9 The Sixth Circuit concluded that
when Maglio stated, "Maybe I should have an attorney," he invoked
his right to counsel and the interrogating officer should have ceased
questioning. 70 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that under the broad
language of Miranda,7 Maglio's reference to counsel was sufficient to
invoke his right to an attorney.72

62. Id. at 204 (summarizing the trial court's factual findings). The trial court
observed that officers properly informed Maglio of his rights to remain silent and to
counsel. Id. The court concluded that Maglio "intelligently and knowledgeably" waived
his rights and voluntarily confessed to the crime. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to grant leave to appeal. Id. (summarizing
the supreme court's factual findings). Maglio sought a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Id.
67. Id. at 207-08. The Sixth Circuit found that Maglio's Fifth Amendment rights had
been violated. Id.
68. Id. at 205 (relying on Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74).
69. Id. at 206-07. Courts advocating a per se bar approach recognize that the denial
of a suspect's request increases the pressure and undermines the protective rules of
Miranda. Id. If interrogating officers continually question and clarify the suspect's
request for counsel, the suspect may reasonably conclude that his request is being
ignored and that it is pointless to make any further attempts. Id. at 207; see, e.g., supra
note I and accompanying text; see infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
70. Maglio, 580 F.2d at 205.
71. See supra note 49.
72. Maglio, 580 F.2d at 205.
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2. The Clarification Approach
Prior to Davis, a clear majority of the state courts and lower federal
courts followed the Fifth Circuit's clarification approach.73 Under the
clarification approach, if a suspect made an ambiguous or equivocal
statement that could be reasonably understood as a possible expression
of a desire for counsel, interrogating officers had to immediately stop
substantive questioning and could only ask questions designed to
clarify whether the suspect wished to consult with counsel.7 4
The Fifth Circuit first introduced the clarification approach in Nash
v. Estelle.7 In Nash, police arrested Ira Nash, Jr., as a suspect for
murder.76 Approximately one week later, the police brought Nash to
the office of the District Attorney for questioning.77 After the Assistant
District Attorney advised Nash of his Miranda rights, Nash made an
equivocal reference to counsel.78 The Assistant District Attorney,
acknowledging Nash's statement, informed Nash that their conversation must cease. 79 Nash reconsidered, agreed to finish the
73. See e.g., United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 483 (1993); United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 436 (1992); United States v. D'Antoni, 856 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Fouche, 833 F.2d
1284 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); United States v. Porter, 776
F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979); United States v. Riggs, 537 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir.
1976); Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Staatz, 768
P.2d 143 (Ariz. 1988); People v. Benjamin, 732 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 1987); State v.
Anderson, 553 A.2d 589 (Conn. 1989); Crawford v. State, 580 A.2d 571 (Del. 1990);
Ruffin v. United States, 524 A.2d 685 (D.C. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1057 (1988);
Martinez v. State, 564 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1990); Hall v. State, 336 S.E.2d 812 (Ga.
1985); Carter v. State, 702 P.2d 826 (Idaho 1985); Sleek v. State, 499 N.E.2d 751 (Ind.
1986); People v. Giuchici, 324 N.W.2d 593 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam); State v.
Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327 (Minn. 1991); Kuykendall v. State, 585 So. 2d 773 (Miss.
1991); Sechrest v. State, 705 P.2d 626 (Nev. 1985); State v. Gerald, 549 A.2d 792 (N.J.
1988); Russell v. State, 727 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856
(1987); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1282 (1992); State v. Robtoy, 653 P.2d 284 (Wash. 1982); State v. Clawson, 270
S.E.2d 659 (W. Va. 1980); Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612 (Wyo. 1986).
74. See Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
While interrogating officers are not absolutely compelled to ask clarifying questions
when a suspect makes an ambiguous reference to counsel, they must ask narrow
clarifying questions, and properly determine that the suspect did not wish to have
counsel present, before continuing to question the suspect about the crime. Id.
75. 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
76. Id. at 514.
77. Id. at 514-15.
78. Id. at 516. Nash's exact words were: "Well, I don't have the money to hire one,
but I would like, you know, to have one appointed." Id.
79. Id.
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interrogation without counsel,80 and subsequently confessed 8,
A Texas trial court judge ruled Nash's confession admissible, 2 and
the Texas appellate court affirmed. 3 The federal district court granted
Nash's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the
official obtained Nash's confession in violation of his right to have
counsel present during questioning.'
On review, the Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of habeas corpus
relief, stating that Nash's indecisive statement was not enough to
invoke his right to counsel.8 5 In reaching this conclusion, the court
found that the Assistant District Attorney who questioned Nash properly clarified Nash's statement, 6 and correctly determined that Nash
wished to continue without an attorney present.81 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the mere mention of an attorney is insufficient to invoke
the right to counsel.8 8 Instead, when a suspect expresses both the
80. Id. at 516-17. The exchange went as follows:
FILES: Okay. I had hoped that we might talk about this, but if you want a
lawyer appointed, then we are going to have to stop right now.
NASH: But, uh, I kinda, you know, wanted, you know, to talk about it, you
know, to kinda, you know, try to get it straightened out.
FILES: Well, I can talk about it with you and I would like to, but if you want a
lawyer, well, I am going to have to hold off, I can't talk to you. It's
your life.
NASH: I would like to have a lawyer, but I'd rather talk to you.
FILES: Well, what that says there is, it doesn't say that you don't ever want
to have a lawyer, it says that you don't want to have a lawyer here,
now. You got the right now, and I want you to know that. But if you
want to have a lawyer here, well, I am not going to talk to you about
it.
NASH: No, I would rather talk to you.
FILES: You would rather talk to me? You do not want to have a lawyer here
right now?
NASH: No, sir.
FILES: You are absolutely certain of that?
NASH: Yes, sir.
Id.
81. Id. at 515.
82. Nash v. State, 477 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (summarizing the
trial court's holding).
83. Id. at 564.
84. Nash, 597 F.2d at 517 (summarizing the district court's factual findings).
85. Id. at 518.
86. Id. at 517. The court stated: "When, as in the case at bar, a desire for immediate
talk clearly appears from the suspect's words and conduct, but he also states he wants a
it is sound and fully constitutional police practice to clarify the course the
lawyer ....
suspect elects to choose." Id.
87. Id. at 520.
88. Id. at 519.
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desire for an attorney and the desire to continue speaking with
officials, it is appropriate for the interrogating officer to clarify the
suspect's true desire.8 9
The Fifth Circuit further defined the scoPe of the Nash clarification
approach in Thompson v. Wainwright. 0 In Thompson, officers
arrested Larry Thompson on suspicion of murder.9 After the officers
advised Thompson of his Miranda rights, Thompson stated that he
wished to consult with an attorney before talking to police. 92 The
interrogating officer ignored Thompson's request and eventually persuaded him to make a statement.93 Thompson later confessed to the
crime.94
The Florida trial court held that Thompson knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.95 After the Supreme Court of
Florida affirmed his conviction,96 Thompson unsuccessfully sought
habeas corpus relief in the federal district court. 97
On review, the Fifth Circuit once again instructed that an
interrogating officer should seek clarification when suspects make ambiguous references to counsel. 98 The Thompson court, however,
required interrogating officers to limit their inquiry strictly to clarifying
89. Id. at 517. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that some suspects wish to unburden
themselves and confess to their involvement in the crime. Id. Taking this into
consideration, the court highlighted the benefits of the clarification approach. Id. at
517-18. The court noted that while the clarification approach protects suspects who do
not wish to deal with the police on their own, this approach also adequately
accommodates those suspects who desire to speak with police immediately, without the
assistance of counsel. Id. at 519. The court observed:
If the word "lawyer" were to be endowed with talismanic qualities, [the
interrogating officer] would have had to order Nash removed from his office
without another word when "lawyer" fell from Nash's lips. However, it is clear
from the context of this colloquy that such unrealistic conduct would have
denied to Nash his true desire to explain himself and to continue with the
interview.
Id. at 519-20.
90. 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1979).
91. Id. at 769.
92. Id. Thompson first agreed to speak with police and signed a waiver of rights card.
Id. He then changed his mind and requested the assistance of counsel. Id.
93. Id. at 770. The officer stated: "[W]e advised him if he told an attorney first he
would not be able to talk to us and tell us his side of the story." Id.
94. Id. at 769-70.
95. Id. at 770 (summarizing the trial court's factual findings). The court observed that
Thompson signed the waiver card and testified at the suppression hearing that he was
aware of and understood his rights at the time of the interrogation. Id.
96. Thompson v. State, 328 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1976).
97. Thompson, 601 F.2d at 770 (summarizing the district court's holding).
98. Id. at 771.
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the ambiguous statement, 99 maintaining that officers must not persuade
or advise suspects to waive their rights.'0° Furthermore, the Thompson court ruled that a suspect's incriminating statements obtained in
response to further questioning about the crime are inadmissible as the
product of coercion."' Consequently, the Thompson court refused to
admit Thompson's confession into evidence because the interrogating
scope of
officer's post-request statements clearly went beyond 10the
2
counsel.
consult
to
wished
Thompson
whether
clarifying
3. The Threshold Standard of Clarity Approach
Other courts, led by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v.
03
Krueger,1
adopted the threshold standard of clarity approach."0 4
This approach required interrogating officers to cease questioning only
if and when a suspect made a request for counsel that met a certain
threshold standard of clarity.'0 5 These courts held that interrogating
officers could continue questioning if a suspect's request for counsel
99. Id. at 771-72. The Thompson court explained that "[]urther questioning [after a
suspect makes an ambiguous request for counsel] must be limited to clarifying that
request until it is clarified." Id. at 771 (emphasis in original).
100. Id. at 772. The Thompson court instructed:
[T]he limited inquiry permissible after an equivocal request for legal counsel
may not take the form of an argument between interrogators and suspect about
whether having counsel would be in the suspect's best interests or not. Nor
may it incorporate a presumption by the interrogator to tell the suspect what
counsel's advice to him would be if he were present.
Id.
101. Id. If the interrogating officer poses questions after the suspect requests counsel
and the suspect freely and voluntarily responds to those questions, under Thompson, the
court must still exclude the suspect's responses. Id. at 771-72. The Thompson court
ruled that officers cannot continue questioning the suspect about his or her involvement
in the crime after the suspect makes an unambiguous request for counsel. Id. at 771.
102. Id. at 772. The court maintained that the interrogating officer's advice was
especially persuasive and improper since it was materially incorrect. Id. While the court
recognized that an attorney may have advised Thompson not to speak with police,
consulting an attorney would not have absolutely prevented Thompson from telling "his
side of the story." Id.
103. 412 N.E.2d 537 (Ill. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981).
104. See People v. Bestelmeyer, 212 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(adopting a "totality of the circumstances" test); Bane v. State, 587 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ind.
1992) (stating that the defendant made "no clear and unequivocal request for an
attorney"); People v. Lattanzio, 549 N.Y.S.2d 179, 181 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (finding
that defendant's alleged invocation of rights did not amount to an unequivocal assertion
of the intention to retain counsel); Bunch v. Commonwealth, 304 S.E.2d 271, 276-77
(Va.) (stating that the validity of waiver depends upon facts of the case), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 977 (1983); Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 177-78 (Wyo. 1982) (stating that
validity of defendant's waiver of rights depends upon the facts of the case).
105. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 96 n.3 (1984).
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did not satisfy this threshold.'0 6
In Krueger,'° officers arrested and charged Michael Krueger with
stabbing a man to death. 10 8 Prior to questioning, officers advised
Krueger of his Mirandarights,' °9 but Krueger waived his rights at that
time.1"' Later, when officers began questioning him about the
stabbing, Krueger made an equivocal reference to counsel."' After
further questioning and verbal persuasion by the officers,.12 Krueger
signed a statement admitting to stabbing the victim to death.'
The Illinois trial court admitted both the oral and written confessions
after concluding that Krueger understood his rights and voluntarily
waived them before the interrogation began."13 The Illinois Appellate
Court affirmed, stating that Krueger's reference 4to counsel was not
clear enough to invoke his rights under Miranda."
The Supreme Court of Illinois agreed with the trial court's findings
of fact and ruled that Krueger did not request the assistance of
counsel." 5 The court held that although Mirandadoes not demand an

106. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d at 540. For example, in each of the following cases, the
court found the suspects' statements regarding counsel to be ambiguous or equivocal:
Bestelmeyer, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 607 ("I just thinkin', maybe I shouldn't say anything
without a lawyer and then I thinkin' ahh."); People v. Kendricks, 459 N.E.2d 1137,
1140 (I11.App. Ct. 1984) ("I think I might need a lawyer."); State v. Moore, 744 S.W.2d
479, 480 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) ("[M]aybe [I] should have an attorney."). In each of
these cases, therefore, the suspect failed to satisfy the courts' threshold standard of
clarity.
107. 412 N.E.2d at 537.
108. Id. at 538.
109. Id.
110. Id. Krueger "stated that he understood his rights" and "signed a written waiverof-rights form." Id.
111. Id. At trial, all three interrogating officers stated that Krueger did not request
counsel. Id. On cross-examination, however, each admitted that Krueger had made some
sort of comment about obtaining an attorney. Id. The officers variously described
Krueger's statement as follows: "Wait a minute. Maybe I ought to have an attorney.
You guys are trying to pin a murder rap on me, give me 20 to 40 years." Id. "Hey, you're
trying to pin a murder on me. Maybe I need a lawyer." Id. "Just a minute. That's a 20 to
40 years sentence. Maybe I ought to talk to an attorney." Id.
112. Id. at 539. Krueger admitted to the stabbing, but he maintained that it was in
self-defense. Id.
113. Krueger, 393 N.E.2d at 1285 (summarizing the trial court's factual findings).
114. Id. at 1286. On appeal, Krueger argued that his Miranda rights had been violated
because the interrogating officers continued questioning him after he requested counsel.
Id.
115. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d at 540. The Illinois Supreme Court stated: "We hold that
the officers did not violate defendant's Miranda rights, for, in this instance, a more
positive indication or manifestation of a desire for an attorney was required than was
made here." Id.
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explicit request for counsel," 6 the mere mention of an attorney is
insufficient to invoke the right to assistance of counsel during a custodial interrogation." 7
The Krueger court relied on the following factors in reaching its
decision: that the suspect was of normal intelligence, that "he fully
understood his Miranda rights, and that he effectively waived his
rights before questioning began."'" 8 The court further observed that
the interrogating officers acted in good faith," 9 and that there was no
evidence that the suspect was under undue coercion or duress.O2O
Thus, the Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that suspects must
make an objectively positive indication of their desire for an attorney 2in
order to invoke their right to counsel during custodial interrogation.1 1
III. DISCUSSION

In Davis v. United States,122 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the problem that arises when a suspect makes an ambiguous
reference to counsel during custodial interrogation. 123 The major issue
before the Court was with what degree of clarity must suspects in
custody assert their right to an attorney in order to stop police
questioning and obtain counsel. 24 The issue which divided the Court,
however, was whether interrogating officers are legally obligated to
cease questioning and pose clarifying questions in response to an
116. See supra notes 33, 49, and accompanying text.
117. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d at 540. The Illinois Supreme Court stated:
Miranda's "in any manner" language directs that an assertion of the right to
counsel need not be explicit, unequivocal, or made with unmistakable clarity.
We do not believe, however, that the Supreme Court intended by this language
that every reference to an attorney, no matter how vague, indecisive or
ambiguous, should constitute an invocation of the right to counsel.
Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The court found that, according to the evidence, none of the interrogating
officers judged the suspect's comments to be a request for counsel. Id. The court stated
that although the officers' subjective beliefs with regard to whether the suspect asserted
his desire for an attorney are not dispositive of whether the suspect did, in fact, invoke
his right to counsel, "the officers must be allowed to exercise their judgment in
determining whether a suspect has requested counsel." Id. The court concluded that the
officers' apparently genuine beliefs that the suspect did not desire the assistance of an
attorney distinguished this case from others relied upon by the suspect in which
interrogating officers consciously violated the suspect's Miranda rights. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see supra note 115.
122. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
123. Id. at 2352.
124. Id. at 2356.
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ambiguous reference to counsel.".
A. Facts and Opinions Below
On November 4, 1988, Naval Investigative Service ("NIS")
officials questioned Robert L. Davis, a navy seaman, in connection26
with the murder of a fellow member of the United States Navy.
Prior to questioning, agents informed Davis of his Article 3 1(b)
rights. 2 7 Davis, handcuffed to a chair in the NIS office,1 28 initially
waived his 29
rights, "both orally and in writing," and agreed to answer
questions.

More than an hour into the interrogation Davis stated, "Maybe I
should talk to a lawyer."' 130 At that point in the interview, according to
concurring).
125. Id. at 2359 (Souter, J.,
126. Id. at 2353.
127. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1988)). Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice provides in relevant part:
(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any statement
from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing
him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to
make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected
and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a
trial by court-martial.
(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or
through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement may
be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
Id. The Davis Court recognized:
We have never had occasion to consider whether the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self incrimination, or the attendant right to counsel during
custodial interrogation, applies of its own force to the military, and we need
not do so here. The President, exercising his authority to prescribe procedures
for military criminal proceedings, has decreed that statements obtained in
violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause are generally not admissible at
trials by court-martial. Because the Court of Military Appeals has held that
our cases construing the Fifth Amendment right to counsel apply to military
interrogations and control the admissibility of evidence at trials by courtmartial, and the parties do not contest this point, we proceed on the
assumption that our precedents apply to courts-martial just as they apply to
state and federal criminal prosecutions.
Id. at 2354 n.* (citations omitted).
128. United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337, 340 (C.M.A. 1993), aff'd, 114 S.Ct. 2350
(1994). Davis reported that agents left him handcuffed to a chair while they took a
break. Id.
129. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2353.
130. Id. There were conflicting stories on exactly what Davis said to the NIS agents.
Davis, 36 M.J. at 340. Davis maintained that he stated, "Well, I'd like a lawyer." Id.
The military judge did not believe that Davis made an unequivocal request for counsel.
Id. at 341 (summarizing the military court's factual findings). The United States Court of
Military Appeals concluded that the military judge's findings of fact were supported and
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one of the interviewing agents, the NIS officials asked Davis to clarify
whether or not he wanted an attorney.' 31 According to the same agent,
Davis responded, "No, I'm not asking for a lawyer. No, I don't want
a lawyer."' 3 2 The agents then took a short break, and before resuming
questioning, they reminded Davis of his rights to remain silent and to
counsel. 33 The interrogation continued for another hour, at which
time Davis stated, "I think I want a lawyer before I say35anything
else. ' ' "MAt that point, the agents stopped the interrogation.
At trial, Davis moved to suppress the statements made during the
November 4 interrogation, claiming that the agents should have ceased
questioning after Davis requested a lawyer. 36 The military trial court
found that Davis' statement was equivocal and not in the form of13a8
request, 37 and denied Davis' motion to suppress the statements.
The court then convicted Davis of unpremeditated murder. 3 9
The United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed the general
courts-martial but on different grounds. 40 The appellate court held
that when interrogating officers can reasonably interpret a suspect's
statement as a possible request for counsel, the officers must clarify
the suspect's wishes before the interrogation may continue.' 4 ' The
court found that: (1) Davis' statement was ambiguous; 142 (2) the
agents properly stopped the interrogation and limited their inquiry to
thus should not be disturbed. Id.
13 1. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353. The NIS officer specifically stated:
"[We m]ade it very clear that we're not here to violate his rights, that if he
wants a lawyer, then we will stop any kind of questioning with him, that we
weren't going to pursue the matter unless we have it clarified is he asking for a
lawyer or is he just making a comment about a lawyer ...
Id. (alteration in original).
132. Id.
1 33. Id. The agents did not repeat Davis' rights in full nor did they execute a second
written waiver. Davis, 36 M.J. at 340.
134. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
135. Id.
136. Davis, 36 M.J. at 341 (summarizing the military trial court's factual findings).
137. Id. (summarizing the military trial court's holding). The Court of Military
Appeals noted that the military judge found "'the mention of a lawyer by the accused
during the course of the interrogation to have been not in the form of a request for
counsel and that the agents properly determined that the accused was not indicating a
desire for or invoking his right to counsel."' Id. (quoting the military judge).
138. Id. (summarizing the military trial court's holding).
139. Id. at 338 (summarizing the military trial court's holding).
140. Id. at 341.
141. Id. The court recognized the three-way split among the various jurisdictions and
adopted the approach taken by "several federal circuits." Id.; see supra part II.C.2.
142. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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clarifying Davis' statement; and (3) the agents correctly concluded that
Davis did not desire the assistance of counsel. 43
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Davis'44 to determine the
appropriate standard regarding ambiguous or equivocal references to
counsel during custodial interrogation. 45 Davis urged the Court to
adopt the per se bar approach, which would require interrogating
officers to cease questioning and to provide an attorney upon any
reference to counsel.' 46 The United States, however, advocated the
clarification approach, arguing that when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel, interrogating officers should
be allowed to ask limited
questions to clarify thesuspect's statement
47
regarding counsel.

143. Davis, 36 M.J. at 342.
144. 114 S. Ct. 379 (1993).
145. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2352.
146. Id. at 2363; Brief for Petitioner at 11-13, Davis, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No.
92-1949).
147. See Brief for Respondent at 20, Davis, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 92-1949).
Neither party proposed the threshold standard of clarity approach which was ultimately
adopted by the Davis Court. Since the interrogating officers used clarifying questions,
the United States only needed to advance the clarification approach. On the other hand,
Davis had to argue for the per se bar approach. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2526; see also
Brief for Petitioner at 11-13, Davis, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 92-1949). Concerned
organizations submitted amicus curiae briefs to the Court, none of which advocated the
threshold standard of clarity approach. The National Association of Criminal Defense
lawyers filed its brief in support of Davis and the per se bar approach. Brief of Amicus
Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Petitioner at 6,
Davis, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 92-1949). This brief explicitly stated:
[T]he vice of [the threshold standard of clarity] doctrine goes beyond its
arbitrary refusal to give constitutional protection to some individuals while
giving other[s] ... the full benefit of the Edwards rule, because the burdens of
a rule favoring direct and assertive language tend to fall disproportionately on
certain identifiable groups within our population.
Id. at 7. Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., joined by the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., The National District Attorneys Association, Inc.,
and The National Sheriffs' Association submitted an amicus brief also advocating the
clarification approach. Brief of Amicus Curiae Americans for Effective Law Enforcement
et al. at 5, Davis, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 92-1949) (describing the clarification
approach as a "common sense resolution ... [which] fully accommodates the rights of
the suspect, while at the same time preserves the interests of law enforcement and of the
public welfare").
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The Supreme Court's opinion' 4 in Davis initially acknowledged the
procedural safeguards created in Miranda to protect suspects against
compulsory self-incrimination. 4 9 The Court emphasized that these
safeguards were not themselves constitutional rights, but instead were
created and imposed by the Miranda Court to combat the inherently
coercive nature of custodial interrogation.' 5" The Davis Court next
reaffirmed the Edwards holding that if at any point during the custodial
interrogation a suspect requests the assistance of counsel, questioning
must cease and may not resume unless or until a lawyer is present or
the suspect reinitiates conversations with the police.' 5 ' The Court
refused, however, to extend the Edwards protections to those situations where a suspect might desire counsel-that is, where the suspect
has not "actually invoked" the right to counsel. 5 2 Although the Court
did not explicitly require an ambiguous or equivocal reference to
counsel to be clarified, the Court acknowledged that good police
practice would often call for the use of clarifying questions to help protect the rights of the suspect."'
148. While the Court's judgment was unanimous, Justice O'Connor wrote for the
narrow five-four majority with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas joining. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2352. Justice Scalia also wrote a concurring
opinion. Id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Souter, joined by Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg, wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment
only. Id. at 2358 (Souter, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 2354. The Court stated: "The right to counsel established in Miranda was
one of a 'series of recommended "procedural safeguards" . .. [that] were not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination was protected."' Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974)); see supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
150. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354.
15 1. Id. at 2354-55.
152. Id. at 2355. The Court explained that "if a suspect makes a reference to an
attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the
circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right
to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning." Id. The Court
required that in order for the suspect to "actually" or properly invoke his right to counsel
"he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a
request for an attorney." Id.
153. Id. at 2356. While rejecting a rule making clarification mandatory before
questioning may continue, the Court recognized the advantages of the use of clarifying
questions. Id. The Court explained:
Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement it will
often be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether
or not he actually wants an attorney ....
Clarifying questions help protect the
rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney if he wants one, and
will minimize the chance of a confession being suppressed due to subsequent
judicial second-guessing as to the meaning of the suspect's statement
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In short, if a suspect invokes the right to counsel, police questioning
must cease; if the suspect does not properly request the assistance of
counsel, the interrogation may continue. 5 4 Thus, the Davis Court, by
demanding that a suspect's request satisfy a certain threshold standard
of clarity, implicitly rejected the "in any manner" language of Miranda
and instead focused on the "clearly asserted" language in Edwards.'55
Addressing the Miranda Court's concern for individual rights, the
Davis Court admitted that requiring a clear assertion of the right to
counsel "might disadvantage some suspects .
*."..,
The Court
reasoned, however, that suspects who fully understand their Miranda
rights are adequately protected from the inherent compulsion of
custodial interrogation. 157 The Court concluded that in order to invoke
the Edwards protections and ultimately cease questioning, a suspect
must articulate a sufficiently clear request so that a reasonable police
58
officer would understand the statement as a request for counsel.
The Davis Court also noted the importance of providing an objective
standard for interrogating officers to follow when faced with a suspect's unclear reference to counsel. 59 The Court adopted the requisite
level of clarity rule,"6 reasoning that it provided a workable standard
that police officers could easily apply.' 6' The Court noted that
regarding counsel.
Id.
154. Id. at 2356-57; see supra note 152 and accompanying text (setting forth the
Court's test for a "proper" invocation of the right to counsel).
155. Compare Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355 (explaining that the suspect "must articulate
his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in
the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney") with
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (explaining that if the suspect
"indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with
an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning") (emphasis added) and with
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981) (explaining that "it is inconsistent with
Miranda and its progeny for the authorities... to reinterrogate an accused in custody if
he has clearly asserted his right to counsel") (emphasis added).
156. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. The Court explained: "We recognize that requiring a
clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who-because
of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons-will not
clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer
present." Id.
157. Id. The Court stated: "'[F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and
request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the
interrogation process."' Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)).
158. Id. at 2355.
159. Id. at 2356. The Court stated: "Although the courts ensure compliance with the
Miranda requirements through the exclusionary rule, it is police officers who must
actually decide whether or not they can question a suspect." Id.
160. See supra note 20.
161. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. The Court explained: "The Edwards rule-
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suspects need not articulate their requests with precision.
Instead,
the test is whether a reasonable officer would construe a suspect's
statement as a valid request for counsel. 63 If the suspect's reference
to counsel falls short of such clarity, the interrogating officer is not
6
obligated to stop questioning or inquire about the suspect's wishes.'
Still, the Court advised that it may be useful for interrogating officers
to ask clarifying questions when a suspect makes an ambiguous or
equivocal reference to counsel.' 65
The Court next maintained that its requisite level of clarity rule best
serves the purposes of Mirandaby balancing law enforcement interests
with the concern for protecting a suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. 66 The Court rejected the per se
bar approach, which required that interrogating officers immediately
cease questioning upon the mere mention of an attorney, as unduly
burdensome to legitimate law enforcement activity.' 67 The Court noted
that while the approach prevents legitimate police investigations, such
a safeguard also deprives the suspect who does not desire the
assistance of counsel the opportunity to speak to police.168 Finally, the
questioning must cease if the suspect asks for a lawyer-provides a bright line that can
be applied by officers in the real world of investigation and interrogation without unduly
hampering the gathering of information." Id.
162. Id. at 2355. Justice Souter criticized the Court's requisite level of clarity
standard, suggesting that trial courts could effectively require suspects to "speak with the
discrimination of an Oxford don" in order to invoke their right to counsel. Id. at 2364.
(Souter, J.,concurring). The Court refuted this contention, stating that the suspect's
request need not be unmistakably clear. Id. at 2355. The Court instructed, however, that
the suspect must articulate his or her desire for an attorney in such a manner that a
reasonable police officer would conclude that the suspect requested counsel. Id.; see
supra note 152.
163. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355; see supra note 152.
164. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2355-56. Once again the Court emphasized the importance
of providing a rigid guideline for interrogating officers to follow. Id. The Court stated:
But if we were to require questioning to cease if a suspect makes a statement
that might be a request for an attorney, this clarity and ease of application
would be lost. Police officers would be forced to make difficult judgment calls
about whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he hasn't said so,
with the threat of suppression if they guess wrong.
Id. at 2356.
165. Id. The Court advised that while clarification is not required, in some situations,
it might be wise for interrogating officials to clarify whether or not the suspect wishes
the assistance of counsel in order to avoid the subsequent suppression of evidence. Id.
The Court explicitly stated that "[c]larifying questions ... will minimize the chance of a
confession being suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the
meaning of the suspect's statement regarding counsel." Id.
166. Id. at 2355-56.
167. Id. at 2356.
168. Id. at 2355-56. The Court stated:
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Court concluded that a "third layer of prophylaxis" was unnecessary
because Miranda and Edwards together serve as adequate safeguards
to protect 69
a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights during custodial interrogation. 1
C. JusticeScalia's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Scalia joined with the Court and also wrote a concurring
opinion. 70 Citing 18 U.S.C. § 3501 as "the statute governing the
admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions,"17
' Justice Scalia
called for its application in the present case. 172 Section 3501 instructs
The rationale underlying Edwards is that the police must respect a suspect's
wishes regarding his right to have an attorney present during custodial
interrogation. But when the officers conducting the questioning reasonably
do not know whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the
immediate cessation of questioning "would transform the Miranda safeguards
into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity,"
because it would needlessly prevent the police from questioning a suspect in
the absence of counsel even if the suspect did not wish to have a lawyer
present.
Id. (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).
169. Id. at 2356-57. The Davis Court stated that in Miranda, the Court held "that a
suspect is entitled to the assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation ...... Id.
at 2356. In Edwards, the Court designed a "second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda
right to counsel[] to prevent police from badgering a [suspect] into waiving his
previously asserted Miranda rights." Id. at 2355. The Davis Court explicitly refused to
extend Edwards, however, stating: "[W]e are unwilling to create a third layer of
prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer." Id. at
2357.
170. Id. at 2357 (Scalia, J.,concurring).
171. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Section 3501 applies to all criminal prosecutions
brought by the United States government. See 18 U.S.C. 3501(a) (1988). Because
Davis involved a federal military prosecution, it could be argued that § 3501 applied.
See Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring). In state criminal prosecutions,
however, § 3501 does not apply.
172. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring). Section 3501 states in
relevant part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District
of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is
voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial
judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to
voluntariness.
If the trial judge determines that the confession was
voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall
permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and
shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it
deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession,
including ... (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he
was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be
used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to
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that a court must receive into evidence any confession that the court
rules voluntary. 73 The jury is then permitted to hear relevant evidence
on the issue of voluntariness74 to help the jury decide how much weight
to attach to the confession.
Justice Scalia maintained that the United States, as a party to the
litigation, 75 has continuously declined to invoke section 3501 despite
its relevance in several cases. 76 He acknowledged that the Court
should not decide matters which the parties have not raised. 7 7 Justice
Scalia noted, however, that it is ultimately within the discretion of the
Court to raise relevant issues, and in certain situations, it is prudent to
do so.' 71 Justice Scalia argued that the Court should have asserted
section 3501,179and not Miranda, as the basis for its decision in the
present case.

questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not
such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and
when giving such confession.
18 U.S.C. § 3501.
173. Id. § 3501(a).
174. Id.
175. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2357-58 (Scalia, J.,concurring). When referring to the
United States, or the Justice Department, as a party to litigation, Justice Scalia used the
concurring).
term "executive.' Id. (Scalia, J.,
176. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated:
This is not the first case in which the United States has declined to invoke
§ 3501 before us-nor even the first case in which that failure has been called
to its attention. In fact, with limited exceptions the provision has been
studiously avoided by every Administration, not only in this Court but in the
lower courts, since its enactment more than 25 years ago.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
concurring).
177. Id. at 2358 (Scalia, J.,
178. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia cited to United States Nat'l Bank v.
Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2177-79 (1993) (finding it
proper for the appellate court to consider an issue despite the parties' failure, upon
suggestion, to raise the issue). Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2358 (Scalia, J., concurring).
179. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2358 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated:
The cited provisions of the Uniform Code and the Military Rules may (though
I doubt it) be independent reasons why the confession here should be excluded,
but they cannot possibly be reasons why § 3501 does not prevent Miranda v.
Arizona from being a basis for excluding them, which is the issue before us.
In any event, the Court today bases its refusal to consider § 3501 not upon the
fact that the provision is inapplicable, but upon the fact that the Government
failed to argue it-and it is that refusal which my present statement addresses.
Id. at 2357 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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D. Justice Souter's ConcurringOpinion
While concurring with the Court's judgment, 80 Justice Souter,
writing for the four-justice concurrence,"' rejected the Court's holding
that during custodial interrogation officers can legally ignore a suspect's attempted invocation that could reasonably be construed as a
request for counsel. 182 Accordingly, Justice Souter advocated the
clarification approach, 1 3 followed by a majority of the lower courts
prior to Davis."4
Justice Souter began his analysis with a lengthy footnote that
rejected the Court's contention that Edwards governed the issue of
ambiguous or equivocal requests for counsel. 85 Noting that Edwards
did not address the legal significance of unclear references to counsel, 186 he pointed out that the Supreme Court and the lower courts
would not have viewed the issue as unresolved if Edwards was
180. Id. at 2358 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter maintained that the
interrogating officers properly asked clarifying questions and correctly determined that
Davis did not wish to have an attorney present during the interrogation. Id. at 2359
(Souter, J., concurring). Thus, he affirmed Davis's conviction, based partly on evidence
of statements obtained after clarifying Davis's ambiguous reference to counsel. Id.
(Souter, J., concurring).
18 1. Id. at 2358 (Souter, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg
joined in the concurring opinion. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter explicitly stated:
I cannot, however, join in my colleagues' further conclusion that if the
investigators here had been so inclined, [the agents] were at liberty to
disregard Davis's reference to a lawyer entirely, in accordance with a general
rule that interrogators have no legal obligation to discover what a custodial
subject meant by an ambiguous statement that could reasonably be understood
to express a desire to consult a lawyer.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
183. Id. (Souter, J., concurring); see supra part II.C.2.
184. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter instructed as
follows: "[W]hen law enforcement officials 'reasonably do not know whether or not the
suspect wants a lawyer,' they should stop their interrogation and ask him to make his
choice clear." Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355).
185. Id. at 2359-61 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter stated, in pertinent
part:
Nor may this case be disposed of by italicizing the words of Edwards v.
Arizona to the effect that when a suspect "clearly assert[s]" his right,
questioning must cease. Even putting aside that the particular statement in
that case was not entirely clear (the highest court to address the question
described it as "equivocal"), Edwards no more decided the legal consequences of
a less than "clear" statement than Miranda, by saying that explicit waivers are
sufficient, settled whether they are necessary. Were it otherwise, there would
have been no need after Edwards to identify the issue as unresolved.
Id. at 2360 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see
supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
186. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring).
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dispositive regarding ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel."l
Recognizing that fairness and practicality guided "nearly three
decades of case law"'18 8 regarding the procedures to be followed during
custodial interrogation, Justice Souter argued that the appropriate
standard for unclear references to counsel must also follow these same
two principles.' 89 Thus, he posited that the clarification approach both
preserved a suspect's free choice between speaking with the police and
remaining silent during the interrogation process' 90 and provided a
clear, workable guideline for interrogating officers to follow.' 9 1
Justice Souter concluded that only the clarification approach could
preserve "both ambitions" by preventing police officials from interrogating a suspect in custody until
it is clear that the suspect does not
92
wish the assistance of counsel. 1
Cognizant of these two principles-fairness and practicality-Justice Souter next evaluated the Court's threshold standard of clarity
approach, and concluded that it did not "fare so well."' '9 He first
evaluated the Court's approach with regard to its protection of individual rights.194 He criticized the Court's explicit disregard for those
suspects who wish to invoke their right to an attorney during
questioning, but who are unable to make a request that sufficiently
satisfies the requisite level of clarity rule. 9 Justice Souter recognized
the dangers of drawing a sharp line between those who "clearly"
request counsel and those who cannot articulate their desire for an
187. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 2359-60 (Souter, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 2360 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter stated:
Throughout that period, two precepts have commanded broad assent: that the
Miranda safeguards exist "to assure that the individual's right to choose
between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation
process" and that the justification for Miranda rules, intended to operate in the
real world, "must be consistent with ... practical realities."
Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987)
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)) (emphasis in original) and
Arizona v. Robertson, 486 U.S. 675, 688 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (alteration
in original) respectively).
190. Id. at 2360 (Souter, J., concurring); see Barrett, 479 U.S. at 528.
191. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359-60 (Souter, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 2360 (Souter, J., concurring).
193. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 2360-61 (Souter, J., concurring).
195. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter noted that the Court's requisite level
of clarity rule failed to protect those individuals who Miranda acknowledged as needing a
heightened degree of linguistic care-those with a poor grasp of the English language,
the intimidated and shy, and the "woefully ignorant." Id. (Souter, J., concurring); see,
e.g., United States v. De La Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 750-51 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing the
difficulties of a suspect not perfectly fluent in English or familiar with the law).

616

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 26

attorney,196 concluding that the Court's approach erroneously makes
the right to counsel depend solely on the clarity of a suspect's statement rather than on the suspect's free choice. 97
Justice Souter also rejected the Court's contention that Miranda
warnings alone sufficiently relieve the inherent coercion of custodial
interrogations.19 In fact, he noted that the Court's approach counteracted the purposes of Miranda, 99 because one of the purposes of
Miranda warnings is to give suspects some control over the interrogation process by allowing them to "cut off' questioning when they
no longer wish to deal with the police alone.200 Justice Souter
implicitly recognized that when a suspect's request for counsel is
equivocal or ambiguous, and is repeatedly ignored by interrogating
officers, the suspect's sense of anxiety grows.20 ' Consequently,
thinking it futile to make further attempts to invoke the right to
counsel, the suspect will likely see confessing as the only way to end
the interrogation. 202
196. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360-61 (Souter, J., concurring). For example, the
Miranda Court specifically noted that interrogating officials play on the weakness of the
suspect, increasing the likelihood of coerced or false confessions. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
455-56. Those who wish the assistance of counsel, but who cannot clearly express their
desire for counsel, will most likely succumb to the pressures of the interrogator and
make incriminating statements to police. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360-61 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
197. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2361-62 (Souter, J., concurring). Considering the fact that
the fundamental purpose of Miranda is to protect the suspect's right to choose freely
between speaking with law enforcement officials and remaining silent, the biggest
danger of the Court's requisite level of clarity approach is that whether the suspect
receives the assistance of counsel depends on fine, subtle distinctions. Based on
sociolinguistic research, one commentator concluded:
The constitutional rights of suspects in police custody are at risk not only
because of how they speak, but also because of how the police hear and
interpret their words ....
As a result, suspects who use [indirect and tentative
modes of expression] are doubly disadvantaged in their attempts to exercise
their Miranda rights.
Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmaticsof Powerlessness in Police
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 288-89 (1993); see, e.g., supra note 111.
198. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2361 (Souter, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring).
200. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 468.
201. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring); see, e.g., People v.
Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 539-40 (Ill. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981). On
cross-examination, the prosecution in Krueger asked the accused why he continued
speaking with police after stating: "I think I should talk to an attorney." 412 N.E.2d at
539-40. The accused responded: "I asked for an attorney before I began the statement,
and I saw that it was not going to get me anywhere, so I just ceased on that line, because
I just knew I wasn't going to get an attorney anyways." Id. at 539.
202. See supra notes 1, 201, and accompanying text. The prosecution in Krueger
asked the accused, "Did it occur to you not to talk any further?" Krueger, 412 N.E.2d at

1995]

Davis v. United States

617

Justice Souter also rejected the contention that the clarification
approach placed too heavy a burden on legitimate police investigations. 3 He found this to be a weak assault against the clarification
approach, which requires only that the interrogating officer clarify
whether or not the suspect actually wanted to have an attorney present
during questioning. 204 Admitting that some police investigations
would suffer from the loss of these confessions, Justice Souter
stressed that Miranda struck a balance in favor of preserving the
suspect's rights. 0 5 In his concurrence, Justice Souter adhered to the
Miranda Court's conclusion that an individual's constitutional rights
cannot be sacrificed to facilitate the investigative process.2
Finally, he maintained that the Court's requisite level of clarity rule
was neither the clearest guide nor the most practical approach for
interrogating officers to follow. 207 Justice Souter asserted that his
approach was more practical because it removed the uncertainty of
539. The accused responded: "[I]t occurred to me I might be up all night and be badgered
by these three detectives." Id.
203. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring). The Court stated that a rule
requiring the immediate cessation of questioning "would transform the Miranda
safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity."
Id. at 2355-56 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).
204. Id. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring). The four concurring Justices found that "the
margin of difference between the clarification approach advocated here and the one the
Court adopts is defined by the class of cases in which a suspect, if asked, would make it
plain that he meant to request counsel (at which point questioning would cease)." Id.
(Souter, J., concurring).
205. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter observed: "While these lost
confessions do extract a real price from society, it is one that Miranda itself determined
should be borne." Id. (Souter, J., concurring); see also Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S.
344, 350 (1990) ("Although recognizing that the Miranda rules would result in the
exclusion of some voluntary and reliable statements, the Court imposed these
'prophylactic standards' on the States to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination." (citation omitted)); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
490 (1964) ("No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is
permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, [his
constitutional] rights.").
206. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring). The Miranda Court rejected
the argument that society's need for interrogation outweighs the suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. The Miranda Court also noted that it had
heard and rejected this argument in the past. Id. (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227, 240-41 (1940)). The Miranda Court explicitly stated: "The whole thrust of our
foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the
individual when confronted with the power of government when it provided in the Fifth
Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself.
That right cannot be abridged." Id. at 479.
207. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter recognized the
overall difficulty in determining what are clear invocations of counsel, stating that some
"difficult judgment calls" would arise applying all three approaches, including the
Court's requisite level of clarity rule. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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guessing whether or not the suspect had intended to invoke the right to
counsel.20 8 He reasoned that clarification is the "intuitively sensible
course"' because it allows suspects the opportunity to exercise their
free choice and to resolve any ambiguity. 10
IV. ANALYSIS
The Davis Court acknowledged that a suspect's Fifth Amendment
rights are sufficiently important to justify the prophylactic safeguards
Mirandarequires. 2 1 The Court also reaffirmed its holding in Edwards
that a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel cannot be
questioned substantively unless an attorney is present or unless the
suspect initiates further conversations with the police. 1 2 Nevertheless, the Court refused to extend the scope of Edwards213 to require
interrogating officers to immediately stop substantive questioning
when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to
counsel.21 4 Instead, the Court apparently concluded that Miranda
rights, taken together with the procedural rules of Edwards, sufficiently shield the suspect from the coercive atmosphere of custodial
interrogation.1 5
208. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
209. Id. (Souter, J., concurring); see infra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
210. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 2354. The Court noted that "'[it remains clear, however, that this
prohibition on further questioning-like other aspects of Miranda-is not itself required
by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on coerced confessions, but is instead justified
only by reference to its prophylactic purpose."' Id. at 2355 (quoting Connecticut v.
Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987)).
212. Id.
213. The Davis Court apparently viewed Edwards as an extension, or second layer, of
the Miranda protections. See id. at 2356-57. See generally Edwards, 451 U.S. 477
(holding that if the suspect invokes the right to counsel at any time, the police may not
question him or her until an attorney arrives). Arguably, however, this would not be an
extension of Edwards (and a further extension of Miranda), because Miranda already
required the immediate cessation of questioning when suspects request counsel in any
manner. See supra note 49.
214. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355. The Court reasoned that because Edwards required
interrogating officers to respect the suspect's wishes regarding counsel, the police were
under no legal obligation to cease questioning and provide an attorney when it was
unclear as to whether the suspect wanted the assistance of counsel. Id. at 2355-56. The
Court concluded that a rule requiring the immediate cessation of questioning would
unduly and unnecessarily frustrate legitimate police investigations, especially when the
suspect did not wish to have an attorney present during the interrogation. Id.
215. The Court explicitly stated:
[Tihe primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is
the Miranda warnings themselves. . . . A suspect who knowingly and
voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having that right explained to
him has indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted. Although
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This Part of the Note analyzes the Court's troublesome rule, which
places form over substance 2 16 by basing a suspect's right to counsel
solely on the suspect's ability to speak clearly and assertively. 1 7 This
Part then discusses the more fair and practical clarification standard
advocated by Justice Souter.18
A. Inherent Weaknesses in the Court's Requisite
Level of Clarity Rule
The Davis Court attempted to strike a balance between preserving a
suspect's right to the assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation and promoting legitimate police investigative activities.2 9
Unfortunately, the Court seriously misjudged the effect of its rule on
both sides of the scale.220 On one side, the Court found that the
procedural safeguards already established in Miranda and Edwards
provide sufficient protections to a suspect.22 ' On the other side, the
Court saw the need for effective law enforcement and determined that
the requisite level of clarity rule gave ample latitude and guidance to
ensure legitimate police practice. 2 Thus, the Court concluded that it
was unnecessary to create a "third layer of prophylaxis" to prevent
police questioning in situations where a suspect might want a
lawyer. 3
As Justice Souter's concurring opinion illustrates, the weaknesses
of the Court's requisite level of clarity rule are readily apparent.224
Contrary to the Davis Court's opinion, the procedural safeguards provided in Miranda and Edwards do not and cannot provide a suspect
Edwards provides an additional protection-if a suspect subsequently requests
an attorney, questioning must cease-it is one that must be affirmatively
invoked by the suspect.
Id. at 2356.
216. Under the Court's requisite level of clarity rule, the focus is on the form of the
request and the choice of words. See id. at 2355. The Court's rule does not put the focus
where it should be, which is on whether the suspect actually wishes the assistance of
counsel. See id. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring).
217. See infra part IV.A.
218. See infra part IV.B.
219. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
220. See id. The Court clearly departed from the Miranda Court's liberal presumption
toward the protection of individual rights, and instead took a very police-oriented
position. See id. at 2355-56. The Court made only a few, conclusory statements
regarding Miranda's Fifth Amendment protections, focusing its attention largely on law
enforcement concerns. Id.
221. See supra notes 157, 169, and accompanying text.
222. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356; see supra note 161 and accompanying text.
223. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2357; see supra note 169 and accompanying text.
224. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360-63 (Souter, J., concurring).
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with adequate protections against the compulsive nature of custodial
interrogation. 2 ' Furthermore, the requisite level of clarity rule fails to
provide what the Court described as an easy, workable standard for
determining whether a suspect invoked the right to counselY 6
First, suspects' interests are not served when courts allow
interrogating officers to ignore suspects' reasonable attempts to invoke
the right to counsel.227 Miranda and Edwards did not address the issue
of ambiguous requests, and their protections do not reach suspects
who are unable to assert a desire for an attorney clearly. 228 The Davis
Court rule is most troublesome because it turns on subtle distinctions,
drawing a sharp line between those who can clearly articulate their
to meet a particular officer's subwishes and those who are unable
230
jective229 standard of clarity.

Under the Court's rule, the right to counsel does not depend on a
" ' Instead,
suspect's free choice, as the Court in Miranda intended.23
the focus shifts to the way in which suspects fashion or form their
words.232 Using this rule, interrogating officers will unwittingly deny
counsel to many suspects who desire an attorney but do not articulate
their wishes clearly, and in the process, will circumvent Miranda's
225. See infra notes 227-45 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 246-54 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 13, 185, and 196. Miranda recognized that suspects have the
right to an attorney present during custodial interrogation. 384 U.S. at 436. Edwards
reaffirmed Miranda and explicitly announced a bright-line rule cutting off interrogation
upon invocation of the right to counsel. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
229. Although the Davis Court implicitly described its standard as an objective test,
see Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356, the requisite level of clarity rule effectively creates a
subjective test. Under the Davis rule, officers are to determine exactly what constitutes a
clear request for counsel based upon their own understanding or interpretation of the
statement. Id. at 2363 n.7 (Souter, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Souter pointed out
that "[iun the abstract, nothing may seem more clear than a 'clear statement' rule, but in
police stations and trial courts the question, 'how clear is clear?' is not so readily
answered." Id. (Souter, J., concurring); see infra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
230. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. Another danger in putting such emphasis on the
suspect's choice of words is the possibility that the interrogating officer will interpret a
statement incorrectly. See, e.g., supra notes 111 and 197. The examples clearly
illustrate one of the dangers in applying the Court's requisite level of clarity rule. See
infra note 243 (discussing the discrepancy between how an interrogating official and a
suspect interpret the clarity in a request for counsel).
231. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. The Miranda Court
summarized the purpose of its rule as follows: "In order to combat . . . [the inherent
pressures of custodial interrogation] and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively
apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored." 384 U.S.
at 467.
232. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
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procedural safeguards.233
The Davis Court failed to appreciate the coercive nature of custodial
interrogation and its effects on suspects.234 It is unreasonable to
expect individuals under considerable stress to make clear demands for
a lawyer.235 By adopting the requisite level of clarity rule, however,
the Court requires suspects who may be confused, scared, or physically and psychologically exhausted to express themselves precisely
and clearly. 6
The inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation 37 is not the
only force frustrating suspects who wish to invoke their right to counsel. In fact, social and cultural differences pose even greater
problems.238 As Justice Souter indicated, research shows that the
233. Most courts had previously rejected the Court's approach because of the
inadequate protections it affords the suspect. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707, 730 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Requiring a strict verbal formula to invoke
the protections of Miranda would 'protect the knowledgeable accused from stationhouse
coercion while abandoning the young person who knows no more than to ask for the...
person he trusts." (quoting Chaney v. Wainwright, 561 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting))); People v. Superior Ct., 542 P.2d 1390, 1394-95 (Cal.
1975) (holding that a demand for unmistakable clarity and resolution of ambiguity
against the accused is contrary to Miranda's intent), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
Writing prior to Davis, one commentator stated:
Too strict a standard would probably exclude many instances of conduct meant
to be counsel assertions and, consequently, would risk constitutional losses in
many cases that merit heightened protection. In many cases in which a
suspect's behavior demands official restraint, such an extreme approach would
allow law enforcement too much freedom to pursue inculpatory statements.
Furthermore, an approach that allows agents to disregard completely every
unclear assertion seems both unnecessarily rigid and oblivious to the reality
that decision-making is not always an instantaneous, all-or-nothing process.
Tomkovicz, supra note 41, at 1011-12.
234. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. The Court maintained that merely advising the
suspect of his or her Miranda rights was sufficient to dispel the suspect's fears and
eliminate the coercive atmosphere during custodial interrogation. Id.
235. Id. at 2361 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter observed: "[M]any . . .
[suspects] will be sufficiently intimidated by the interrogation process or overwhelmed
by the uncertainty of their predicament that the ability to speak assertively will abandon
them." Id. (Souter, J., concurring); see supra notes 6, 25, 30, and accompanying text
(discussing the intimidating nature of interrogation); see, e.g., supra notes 1, 201-02,
and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity in requests for counsel).
236. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360-61.
237. See supra notes 6, 25, 30, and 235.
238. See, e.g., United States v. De La Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 1992). In De
La Jara,the suspect requested counsel in Spanish. Id. at 750. The interpreter maintained
that the suspect's statement could have been an assertion or a question depending on the
manner and context in which the statement was made. Id. The interpreter listed the
possible translations as follows: "Can I call my attorney?," "Should I call my
attorney?," or "I should call my lawyer." Id. The court stated that "the meaning of De La
Jara's statement is crucial, as the alternate translations have different legal effects." Id.
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Court's clarity requirement may unfairly disadvantage specific groups
of people. 239 For instance, one sociolinguistic study revealed that
women, African-Americans, and immigrants are far more likely to use
nonassertive or indirect language that makes them appear indecisive or
hesitant when, in fact, they are emphatic in their opinions or desires.2 °
Consequently, the burden of Davis falls disproportionately on these
groups. 1 Indeed, the Court explicitly acknowledges and accepts this
24
result.
Remarkably, not only does the Court's approach fail to protect a
suspect's rights during questioning,242 it also enhances the compelling
atmosphere of custodial interrogation. As Justice Souter stated, a
suspect's anxiety increases when officers ignore a request which the
suspect believes is sufficient to invoke the right to counsel.243 Furthermore, as he pointed out, a suspect will most likely perceive additional
requests as futile.244 Unable to withstand the pressures of interrogation, the suspect may simply confess to the crime.245
The Court also overestimates the practical application and utility of
the requisite level of clarity rule. 246 The Court emphasized the need for
a clear guide that interrogating officers could easily apply when
determining whether to proceed with questioning,247 concluding that
239. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360-61 (Souter, J., concurring). See Ainsworth, supra
note 197, at 286-87; see also Bonnie Erickson et al., Speech Style and Impression
Formation in a Court Setting: The Effects of "Powerful" and "Powerless" Speech, 14 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 266 (1978).

240. See Ainsworth, supra note 197, at 317-18. Speakers who use indirect methods
of speech often interject words such as "I think" or "maybe" into otherwise clear and
direct statements. Id. at 276-77. They may also attach "tag questions" to the end of
statements. Id. at 277-78. For example, the suspect might state, "I should get a lawyer,
shouldn't l?" Id. In both situations, the speaker conveys uncertainty to the listener
even when, in fact, the speaker knows exactly what he or she wants. Id.
241. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356; see supra note 156.
242. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360-61 (Souter, J., concurring).
243. A major problem with the Court's approach is the law enforcement officials' and
the suspect's diverging views about what words are sufficient to invoke the right to
counsel. See Ainsworth, supra note 197, at 288-92. While a trained officer may
understand subtle distinctions such as the use of "maybe" or "I think" as undermining a
valid request, the suspect will likely view almost any statement referring to an attorney
as a legitimate request for counsel. Id.
244. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring); see supra notes 1, 201-02,
and accompanying text.
245. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring); supra notes 1, 201-02,
and accompanying text.
246. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355. The Court noted that "[t]o avoid difficulties of
proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective
inquiry." Id.
247. Id. at 2356. The Court stressed that although courts force compliance with the
Miranda requirements through the exclusionary rule, police officers themselves must
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its approach provided such a "bright-line" test."8 The requisite level
of clarity rule requires that the interrogating officer determine what is a
"clear" request for counsel and what is not. 249 But, as Justice Souter
suggests, the Court's approach leads to the same "difficult judgment
calls" as the other approaches.' 0 Undeniably, requests for counsel are
rarely "crystal clear. '25 Under the Court's requisite level of clarity
approach, however, interrogating officers are left to determine whether
a suspect's statement is "clear" or whether it is "ambiguous. 252
Furthermore, the Court does not take into consideration the conflicting interests of the interrogating officer and the suspect. Police
officers know that they will most likely lose the confession if the
suspect consults counsel.2 3 Nevertheless, under the Court's rule,
decide whether they can question a suspect. Id. Consequently, interrogating officers
need a "bright-line" rule that can be easily applied without placing too heavy a burden
on the investigative process. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2355. The Davis Court noted the Court has previously observed that "'a
statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not."' Id. (quoting
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1984) (per curiam)). In terms of practical
application, however, the Court cannot claim that this approach will eliminate all
confusion in interpreting ambiguous statements referring to an attorney. Id. at 2363 n.7
(Souter, J., concurring). There will always be close situations where the officer is unsure
of the suspect's wishes regarding counsel. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). See supra notes
246, 248, and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., Smith, 469 U.S. at 93. When the officers informed the accused of his
Miranda rights, the accused stated "I'd like to do that." Id. The Illinois Appellate Court
found Smith's statement "clear and unequivocal." People v. Smith, 447 N.E.2d 556, 559
(I11.App. Ct. 1983). The Illinois Supreme Court determined that the accused's statement
was ambiguous and concluded that the accused failed to invoke his right to counsel.
People v. Smith, 466 N.E.2d 236, 240 (I11. 1984). The United States Supreme Court
found the accused's statement to be "neither indecisive or [sic] ambiguous." Smith, 469
U.S. at 97.
251. See Smith, 469 U.S. at 101 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
252. Some examples of "difficult judgment calls" include: Poyner v. Murray, 964
F.2d 1404, 1409 (4th Cir.) ("Didn't you say I have a right to an attorney?"), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 419 (1992); United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1472 (11th
Cir.) ("I don't know if I need a lawyer, maybe I should have one, but I don't know if it
would do me any good at this point."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 436 (1992); Shedelbower
v. Estelle, 885 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1989) ("You know, I'm scared now. I think I
should call an attorney."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1092 (1991); Smith v. Endell, 860
F.2d 1528, 1529 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Can I talk to a lawyer? At this point, I think maybe
you're looking at me as a suspect ... ?"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990); White v.
Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1979) ("I'd rather see an attorney."), vacated,
451 U.S. 1013 (1981).
253. See generally Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964) (noting that
"'any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no
statement to police under any circumstances.' (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,
59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part))).
To get a better idea of interrogating officers' motivations during custodial
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which makes clarification optional, the officer responsible for protecting a suspect's rights and making the clarity determination is the
same officer seeking the confession." 4 From a practical standpoint, it
is difficult to argue that an officer with such diverging interests can
provide the objective, unbiased protections assumed by the Court.
A final weakness of the Davis opinion is the Court's contention that
the clarification approach would unduly burden police and their
investigative activities. While it is true that requiring the immediate
cessation of questioning will result in some lost confessions, Miranda
explicitly accepted this trade-off. 55 Justice Souter agreed that the
Miranda Court chose to sacrifice those confessions obtained against
the will of the suspect.s 6 Thus, although clarification may result in
some loss of incriminating statements, the clarification approach is
consistent with Miranda, which mandates that the overall benefit of
preventing police coercion during custodial interrogation outweighs the
cost of lost confessions. 57
B. Justice Souter's ClarificationApproach
While the Davis Court adopted the strict requisite level of clarity
rule, Justice Souter advocated the more flexible clarification approach. 2 8 The clarification approach represents a common sense
compromise between the more radical per se bar and the requisite level
of clarity approaches. 9 It extends adequate protection against selfincrimination while providing the latitude essential to legitimate police
interrogation, the author spoke to an attorney with the Cook County, Illinois, State's
Attorney's Felony Review Unit. Attorneys with the Felony Review Unit interrogate
suspects generally after police questioning in order to obtain information, assess the
case, and decide whether or not to pursue an indictment. Interview with Assistant State's
Attorney from the Cook County, Illinois, Felony Review Unit, in Chicago, Ill. (Oct.
25, 1994). The attorney requested anonymity.
254. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
255. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479; see supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
256. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring); see supra note 206.
257. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
258. See supra part III.B-D. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg joined Justice
Souter's concurrence,
259. The per se bar approach calls for the immediate cessation of questioning upon
the mere mention of counsel. Maglio, 580 F.2d at 205. The requisite level of clarity
rule requires unmistakably clear requests for counsel before interrogating officers are
under a legal obligation to stop questioning about the crime. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
Striking a balance between these two approaches, the clarification approach requires
that statements be a reasonable expression of the desire to consult with an attorney. Id.
at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring). Thereafter, if the interrogating officer employs narrow,
clarifying questions and determines that the suspect does not wish to have counsel
present, the officer may continue questioning. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).

1995]

Davis v. United States

625

investigative activity. 26°
Justice Souter's clarification approach is the more practical approach
for several reasons. First, the clarification approach affords more
protection by reducing the level of clarity required to invoke the right
to counsel. 26' This approach acknowledges that most suspects will not
speak with lawyer-like precision. 62 Thus, in order to stop the interrogation, a suspect need only make a statement that is arguably an
expression of the desire for counsel.263
Second, the clarification approach allows the suspect-rather than
police officials-to decide whether or not to obtain the assistance of
counsel. 264 After a suspect makes an ambiguous reference to counsel,
and questioning about the crime ceases, interrogating officers may
attempt to clarify the suspect's statement and may not proceed until the
suspect explains any desires regarding counsel. 265 For example, if the
suspect makes an equivocal reference to counsel, an interrogating
officer may ask, "Do you wish to have an attorney here with you
during the interrogation? '266 The suspect need only respond with a
"yes" or "no" answer, thereby resolving any ambiguity. If interrogating officers wish to proceed with the interrogation, they must
pursue this narrow line of questioning until it is clear that the suspect
wants to continue without the assistance of counsel. 267 Thus, even
when the suspect cannot initially articulate a request for an attorney,
260. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
261. In fact, the level of clarity necessary for a suspect to ultimately invoke the right
to counsel will most likely be the same under both the clarification approach and the
requisite level of clarity rule. The clarification approach provides greater protection to
suspects, however, because the clarification approach mandates that interrogating
officers stop substantive questioning once the suspect makes a statement that the officer
could reasonably interpret to be an expression of the desire for counsel. Thompson, 601
F.2d at 771. In order to continue the interrogation, the officer must then ask clarifying
questions to determine whether the suspect wishes the assistance of an attorney. Id.
Clarifying questions assist suspects by providing them with another chance to
communicate their true desires regarding counsel. See supra note 74 and accompanying
text.
262. See, e.g., supra notes 61, 80, 106, 111, 130, and 252.
263. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring).
264. Id. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring).
265. See supra notes 99-100.
266. Justice Souter noted that the agents properly clarified Davis's ambiguous
statement by posing questions "aimed solely at clarifying whether a suspect's
ambiguous reference to counsel was meant to assert his Fifth Amendment right." Davis,
114 S.Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring); see supra note 131.
267. Justice Souter suggested that when interrogating officers do not know whether
the suspect intended to invoke his or her right to counsel, "[officers] should stop their
interrogation and ask him to make his choice clear." Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2359 (Souter,
J.,concurring).
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officers can effectively determine the suspect's actual wishes by asking
clarifying questions.26
Most importantly, Justice Souter's clarification approach also provides an incentive for interrogating officers to determine whether or
not a suspect wants to consult an attorney. Under the clarification
approach, the interrogation must cease when a suspect makes a
statement that could reasonably be construed as a request for counsel. 269 As a result, the clarification approach encourages interrogating
officers to clearly inform suspects of their choice between obtaining an
attorney and dealing with the police alone.2 70 In this way, a suspect
decides whether to have an attorney present and interrogating officers
are not forced to speculate about the suspect's wishes or make any
"difficult judgment calls." 27'
The Court's approach fails to provide the same incentive for
interrogating officers.272 Under the Court's approach, officers are not
required to stop the interrogation unless the suspect's request is direct
and clear. 2 " Although the Court suggests that it would be "good
police practice for interviewing officers to clarify" the wishes of a
suspect, the Court does not require interrogating officers to ask clarifying questions.274 Thus, there is no true incentive for interrogating
officers to ascertain whether a suspect wishes to consult with an
attorney. Accordingly, there is no reason to risk the loss of a confession by stopping and clarifying whether the suspect meant to invoke
the right to counsel.

268. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
269. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring).
270. Interrogating officers may lose an incriminating statement or confession by
clarifying the suspect's reference to counsel. See supra note 205 and accompanying
text. Under the clarification approach, however, officers must risk this loss if they wish
the opportunity to continue questioning the suspect immediately and without an
attorney present. Indeed, unless the interrogating officer clarifies the suspect's
ambiguous statement and determines that the suspect does not wish the assistance of
counsel, all questioning must cease until an attorney is provided. See supra part II.C.2.
27 1. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring).
272. By refusing to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions, the
Court removed a critical incentive for officers to determine whether suspects intended to
invoke their right to counsel during custodial interrogation. Under the Court's requisite
level of clarity approach, interrogating officers "are at liberty to disregard [a suspect's]
reference to a lawyer entirely, in accordance with a general rule that interrogators have
no legal obligation to discover what custodial subject meant by an ambiguous statement
.... Id. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring).
273. Id. at 2355.
274. Id. at 2356.
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IMPACT

The Davis decision creates at least two possible results: (1) courts,
in applying the Supreme Court's decree, will provide suspects less
protection against compulsory self-incrimination during custodial interrogation; 275 or (2) states will reject Davis as insufficient, adopt an
alternative standard, and afford suspects greater protections under their
respective state constitutions. 276
A. Lessening Individual Protection in Applying Davis
Since Davis, federal jurisdictions that previously followed the clarification standard must now abide by the requisite level of clarity
rule.2 7 7 Prior to Davis, courts in jurisdictions following the
clarification approach compelled interrogating officers to clarify a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel before continuing
with the interrogation and taking the suspect's statement.278 Now,
these courts must leave the decision to individual officers of whether
or not to clarify a suspect's unclear reference to counsel. 279 As long as
a suspect's statement falls below the threshold standard of clarity,
275. See infra part V.A. Courts that have already interpreted Davis include: United
States v. Buckley, 36 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1154 (1995); Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420 (11 th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 515 (1994). See
supra note 32.
276. See infra part V.B.
277. See, e.g., Coleman, 30 F.3d at 1422-24. In Coleman, a sixteen-year-old killed
his ten-year-old sister. Id. at 1422. During custodial interrogation, when asked if the
accused wished to make a voluntary statement to police, the accused stated, "I don't
know. But if [the public defender] said to stop [the questioning] I don't want to do what
he said not to do." Id. at 1423. The officers continued to ask the accused to speak with
them about the crime, despite the fact that the public defender had said that she would
instruct the accused not to answer any questions. Id. at 1422-23. The accused finally
stated, "I guess if that guy thinks it's all right, I don't care," and proceeded to confess to
the murder. Id. at 1423. The court ruled the accused's statement equivocal and held that
he did not invoke his right to an attorney. Id. at 1424. The court explained:
Before the Supreme Court's recent decision in Davis v. United States, the
rule in this Circuit was that: "When a defendant makes an equivocal request for
an attorney during a custodial interrogation, 'the scope of that interrogation is
immediately narrowed to one subject and one only. Further questioning
thereafter must be limited to clarifying that request until it is clarified."'
Because we are bound to follow the Supreme Court's holding in Davis, our
decisions creating a duty to clarify a suspect's intent upon an equivocal
invocation of counsel are no longer good law.
Id. at 1423-24 (quoting Owen v. Alabama, 849 F.2d 536, 539 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir. 1979))) (emphasis in original).
278. See supra part II.C.2.
279. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
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courts cannot punish interrogating officers for forging ahead without
clarifying whether or not the suspect actually wanted the assistance of
an attorney.28°
Consequently, interrogating officials in the stationhouse will likely
reduce the level of protection provided to suspects during custodial
interrogation.281 Interrogating officers may now continue questioning
a suspect in situations where the clarification approach, in the past,
forced them to cease questioning about the crime.282 In most present
situations, an officer will probably not ask a suspect "whether or not
he wishes to consult with an attorney., 283 It is contrary to the interrogating officer's interest to offer the assistance of counsel in such a
blunt manner, 4 and few officers will risk losing the confession by
employing such clarifying questions.285 Instead, officers will continue
to pose questions about the crime unless the suspect clearly articulates
the desire to have an attorney present.286
B. Rejecting Davis as Insufficient
The Miranda Court explicitly recognized that its method was not the
only means for protecting a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights.28 7
Indeed, the Miranda Court encouraged Congress and the States to
280. See, e.g., Coleman, 30 F.3d at 1424.
281. See id.
282. Interview with Assistant State's Attorney from the Cook County, Illinois,
Felony Review Unit, in Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 25, 1994). The prosecuting attorney from
the Felony Review Unit reported that, in her experience, since Davis, interrogating
officials are less inclined to give the benefit of the doubt to the suspect whose request for
counsel is unclear. Id. For example, she stated that, in the past, she would have accepted
as a valid request, or at least clarified the suspect's statement, "I think I probably should
talk to a lawyer." Id. After Davis' "sufficient clarity" requirement, however, she would
not consider this clear enough to trigger the suspect's right to counsel. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. The prosecuting attorney stated that in her experience, during custodial
interrogation, questioning officials generally inform the suspect of his or her right to
counsel but refrain from explicitly asking whether the suspect would like to have an
attorney present. Id.
285. Id. The prosecuting attorney stated that in her experience, most interrogating
officials will not clarify suspects' statements by explicitly asking suspects whether or
not they want an attorney present during the interrogation. Id. Rather, interrogating
officials simply instruct suspects that they cannot offer any advice, and readvise them
that they have the right to an attorney. Id. Interrogating officials will not lay out
suspects' choices too plainly because of the increased chance of losing confessions. Id.
286. Id.; see supra note 277.
287. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. The Court stated that the procedures laid out in
Miranda must be followed "unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and assuring a continuous
opportunity to exercise it." Id.
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28
devise superior methods for protecting the rights of individuals.
Because states may extend greater protections under their state constitutions, state legislatures and courts can provide greater protection to
suspects during custodial interrogation than that afforded under the
Davis rule.28 9
Thus, a second likely response is for states to reject Davis as
inadequate and to adopt a more effective alternative standard. In fact,
Hawaii has already taken such an approach. In State v. Hoey,290 the
Supreme Court of Hawaii refused to accept the Davis Court's rationale. 29' Rather, the Hoey court interpreted the Hawaii Constitution
as providing broader protections to the privilege against self-incrimination than the Federal Constitution. ' The Hoey court, adopting
Justice Souter's reasoning in Davis, 293 concluded that the clarification
standard provided a suspect greater safeguards during custodial
interrogation.294
288. Id.
289. See LATZER, supra note 32, at 4.
290. 881 P.2d 504 (Haw. 1994).
291. Id. at 523. In Hoey, police arrested the suspect for robbery and kidnapping. Id.
at 508. During custodial interrogation, when the officer asked the suspect whether he
wished to have an attorney present, the suspect stated, "I don't have the money to buy
one." Id. at 509. The officer did not readvise the suspect that he could have an attorney
appointed if he could not afford counsel. Id. Instead, the officer asked if the suspect
wanted counsel present at that time. Id. The suspect responded, "Right now, I don't
think so." Id. Shortly thereafter the suspect confessed to the crime. Id. The Hawaii
Supreme Court ruled the confession inadmissible because the officer failed to clarify the
ambiguity of the suspect's reference to counsel. Id. at 523.
292. Id. The Hoey court explained:
This court "has always been mindful of its obligation to 'afford defendants the
minimum protection required by federal interpretations of the . . . Federal
Constitution .... .' By the same token, as the ultimate judicial tribunal with
final, unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawai'i
Constitution, we are free to give broader protection under the Hawai'i
Constitution than that given by the federal constitution.
Id. (quoting State v. Hutch, 861 P.2d 11, 19 (Haw. 1993) (quoting State v. Texeira, 433
P.2d 593, 597 n.2 (Haw. 1967))) (alteration in original).
293. The Supreme Court of Hawaii stated:
[W]e choose to afford our citizens broader protection under article I, section 10
of the Hawai'i Constitution than that recognized by the Davis majority under
the United States Constitution by aligning ourselves with the jurisdictions in
the ". . . (clarification] camp" ....
In reaching our holding, we adopt the reasoning of Justice Souter set forth in
his concurring opinion in Davis ....
Id. (footnote omitted).
294. Id. at 524. The Hoey court stated:
Simply ignoring the fact that the [ambiguous] statement was made will not
suffice.... The burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a
waiver of a constitutional right was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent rests
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Davis v. United States, 295 the Supreme Court refused to extend
the protections created in Miranda v. Arizona296 and Edwards v.
Arizona 297 to suspects who fail to clearly articulate their desire for the
assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation. The Court
adopted the requisite level of clarity rule which provides that interrogating officers are under no constitutional obligation to cease
questioning a suspect about a crime unless or until the suspect's
request for counsel meets the threshold standard of clarity.29 The
Davis Court recognized the advantages of the clarification approach
advocated by a minority of the courts; however, the Court refused to
require the clarification of ambiguous or equivocal requests for
counsel.2 9 9 Consequently, individuals who are unable to express
clearly their desire for the presence of counsel during custodial
interrogation will be denied necessary Fifth Amendment protections
against compulsory self-incrimination.3°°
NANCY
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upon the [prosecution]. Based on the foregoing, we cannot find that the
[prosecution] met this burden.
Id.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
Id. at 2356; see supra part III.B.

300. See supra parts IV-V.

